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Abstract. In this paper we propose an efficient authentication and integrity scheme to support DGPS corrections
using the RTCM protocol, such that the identified vulnerabilities in DGPS are mitigated. The proposed scheme is
based on the TESLA broadcast protocol with modifications that make it suitable for the bandwidth and processor
constrained environment of marine DGPS.
1 Introduction
In recent times critical infrastructure has received much attention due to many government security initiatives. Satellite-
based navigation is used by many sectors, including aviation, marine and ground-based transportation. Differential
Global Positioning System (DGPS) radiobeacons are primarily used for marine navigation, where high integrity and
highly accurate location data is required for harbor approaches and constricted waterways control. This is particularly
important in safety critical environments, where DGPS aims to provide enhanced safety for the transportation of
hazardous cargo.
While much recent attention has been focused towards the security of Global Positioning System (GPS) and its
signaling, there has been little focus on the security of DGPS broadcasts. This paper will discuss a number of attacks
that can be theoretically mounted against DGPS broadcast stations, in an attempt to spoof location or facilitate denial
of service. In addition, this paper attempts to address these security issues through the proposal of an authentication
and integrity scheme that can assure the DGPS broadcasts originate from a trusted source, and that the broadcast data
has not been tampered with.
This is facilitated through our proposed variation of the Time Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA)
protocol [5] that provides the basis from which integrity and authenticity is provided to the Radio Technical Core for
Maratime Services (RTCM) messages that are broadcast. The efficiency and time/bandwidth costs of this scheme will
be discussed, and finally we discuss the security of the proposed scheme.
2 Marine Differential GPS Augmentation
The marine DGPS navigation service is an augmentation to GPS, providing pseudorange corrections and other ancil-
lary information such as satellite health. This is designed to facilitate accurate navigation for critical harbor and harbor
approach areas, as well as navigation through critical constricted waterways.
The following subsections will briefly introduce the concepts behind differential GPS, and discuss the implemen-
tation specific to marine radiobeacons.
2.1 Differential GPS
The accuracy of the Global Positioning System (GPS) is affected by numerous sources of errors.
1. Satellite clocks Errors can be introduced from minute discrepancies that occur in the atomic clocks used on the
satellites;
2. Satellite ephemeris prediction errors The satellite orbit is constantly monitored, however slight orbit or “ephemeris”
errors can occur in between monitoring intervals;
3. Ionospheric delay Charged particles of the ionosphere may cause delays on the GPS signaling;
4. Tropospheric delay The GPS signaling can be delayed by water vapor in the troposphere;
5. Multipath errors Multiple copies of the signal can be received at a GPS receiver due to the effects of signal
reflection, refraction, diffraction, etc. Some receivers use sophisticated signal rejection techniques to minimize
this problem.
6. Artificial errors Up till May 2000, the U.S. Department of Defense used selective availability to degrade location
accuracy to civilian / non-authorized users. This was done by dithering the satellite clock and / or broadcasting
erroneous orbital ephemeris data to create a pseudorange error.
These errors can be reduced by applying corrections to the pseudoranges.
A DGPS monitoring station within 200km of another GPS receiver both observe the same pseudoranging signals
and are prone to the same errors, given that both will have traveled though virtually the same part of the atmosphere.
A DGPS monitoring station measures timing errors by comparing the observed time of arrival with the calculated
time of arrival, given the known fixed position of the monitoring station. This error information is then transmitted
to a DGPS receiver in the form of user differential range error (UDRE) scale factors and pseudorange corrections for
visible satellites.
Typical errors that can be seen in GPS and corrected using DGPS are detailed in Table 1.
Standard GPS Differential GPS
Satellite Clocks 1.5 0
Orbit Errors 2.5 0
Ionosphere 5.0 0.4
Troposphere 0.5 0.2
Receiver Noise 0.3 0.3
Multipath 0.6 0.6
Table 1. Typical Error in Meters (per satellite) affecting GPS and DGPS Accuracy1
2.2 Marine DGPS
Marine DGPS radiobeacons operate in the frequency range 283.5-325kHz, using Minimum Shift Keying (MSK) mod-
ulation to transmit the corrections. The corrections are transmitted using the RTCM-SC104 protocol.[3] They have
ranges from 40 to 300 nautical miles. These are not commercial services, rather operated by government authorities2.
The broadcast standard for the United States Coast Guard DGPS navigation service [6] details the requirements
for DGPS monitoring stations and receivers for use in marine navigation.
It is a requirement that DGPS monitoring stations will ensure the integrity of the broadcast pseudorange corrections
on the pseudorange level as well as on the positional level through the use of integrity monitors. Figure 1 illustrates
the integrity monitoring process.
A DGPS receiver must alert the user of any out of tolerance or unhealthy conditions in the DGPS corrections. This
is done through the following alarm mechanisms as specified in [6]:
– Pseudorange Alarms These alarms are broadcast by setting the pseudo range corrections (PRC) field of the RTCM
message header to 1000 0000 0000 0000 and the RRC field to 1000 0000. The user equipment should detect this
setting and immediately stop applying any PRC derived information for that satellite until the alarm condition
ends.
– Position Alarms These alarms occur when either an insufficient constellation exists due to the lack of healthy
pseudoranges or the failure of the pseudorange weighting or monitoring functions.
1 Sourced from http://www.trimble.com/gps/errorsources.html.
2 See http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/ for DGPS sites within the USA, and http://www.iala-aism.org/web/
index.html for a list of world-wide maritime DGPS sites
Fig. 1. DGPS Integrity Monitoring Process
– Unmonitored Alarm This alarm is raised when the corrections are not being monitored. In this case integrity in
not provided.
The application of integrity messages is defined in [6] such that if an unhealthy or unmonitored condition exists as
indicated by the message header of any message, it should be conveyed to the user equipment as a textual message. In
addition, unhealthy or unmonitored conditions should cause a visual alarm to activate.
The RTCM messages that are transmitted are detailed in Table 2.
No. Message Name Description
1 Differential GPS Corrections Fixed This is the primary message type used to provide pseudorange
corrections.
3 GPS Reference Station Parameters
Fixed
This message contains the reference station’s geographical lo-
cation in Earth-Centered-Earth-Fixed (ECEF) coordinates. This
message is typically transmitted every 3 to 30 minutes depend-
ing on the service provider.
5 GPS Constellation Health Fixed This message contains information notifying users of satellite
health.
6 GPS Null Frame Fixed This message is used as a transmission filler for when there are
no other messages transmitted.
7 DGPS Radiobeacon Almanac Fixed This message provides a DGPS receiver with the information to
select the optimum DGPS transmitter.
9 GPS Partial Correction Set Fixed This message is of the same format as type 1, however unlike
message type 1, it contains a smaller number of satellites. This
message is transmitted at a much higher rate than the type 1
message, allowing a faster resynchronization.
16 GPS Special Message Fixed This message is used to convey ASCII messages.
Table 2. RTCM Fixed Message Types
3 Attacks Against DGPS Transmissions
This section discusses possible attacks against marine DGPS radiobeacons with the intention of maliciously causing
errors in the location calculation of a DGPS receiver, or denial of service.
While DGPS systems may facilitate integrity monitoring of the GPS constellation and the corrections that are
being transmitted, it does not provide any origin authentication or integrity protection of these transmissions.
RTCM-SC104 messages include 6 bits of parity in each 30 bit word. While this provides protection against unin-
tentional message corruption, it does not prevent an adversary from changing a message and recalculating the parity.
Because there is no origin authentication of RTCM messages, it is very difficult to differentiate between a legitimate
DGPS radiobeacon and a malicious one.
Similarly to GPS, DGPS is vulnerable to jamming and spoofing attacks, however there is very little publicly
available information on these vulnerabilities. Vople in [2] mentions that spoofing attacks on DGPS broadcast stations
are hypothetically possible, however does not elaborate on the types of attacks.
A number of possible attacks are summarized below, however they are hypothetical as we are not able validate
them. To a large extent, the ability to successfully perform an attack on a civilian receiver depends on its sophistication
in rejecting erroneous correction data. We have identified two categories of attacks that can be performed against
DGPS, which are discussed in the following subsections.
3.1 DGPS Spoofing
DGPS spoofing involves providing incorrect corrections to a DGPS user, with the intention to mislead them as to their
location. The affects of a spoofing attack on a GPS receiver’s position solution depends on the rejection characteris-
tics of the GPS receiver. Inevitably some GPS receivers will accept virtually any correction data, regardless of how
erroneous it is.
Spoofing GPS requires significant resources, such as pseudolites to produce fake signals. While the Coarse/Acquistion
(C/A) code is known and is relatively easy to generate, the signal structure and modulation technique are significantly
more complex than DGPS. The signal structure of DGPS is known and trivial to recreate. RTCM message encoders
are readily available on the Internet as part of projects such as DGPSIP3.
Spoofing can possibly be achieved by providing misleading information in the following messages:
– Type 1 - Differential GPS Corrections This message provides correction data for satellites in view of the DGPS
reference station. It is used to provide psuedorange corrections (PRC) to a user for a GPS measurement at time t,
such that:
PRC(t) = PRC(t0) + RRC · (t − t0), where PRC is the pseudorange correction, RRC is the rate of change of the
pseudorange correction, and t0 is the modified Z-COUNT from the message header. The pseudorange measured by
the user, PRM(t) can be corrected, such that: PR(t) = PRM(t) + PRC(t). Misleading pseudorange and rate-range
corrections can be sent to the user in order to spoof their location.
Misleading information can be provided for the User Differential Range Error (UDRE) parameter, which is an
estimate of the standard deviation of the differential error as determined at the reference station. The UDRE can
be used to weight the user’s position solution. Providing misleading information in the header may also contribute
in spoofing the position solution of a user.
– Type 9 - GPS Partial Correction Set This message is similar to Type 1 messages, with the exception that corrections
for a maximum of 3 satellites are transmitted instead of all visible satellites.
– Type 5 - GPS Constellation Health This message is used to notify user equipment that an unhealthy satellite
is deemed usable for DGPS. Civilian GPS receivers that detect spoofing though monitoring of carrier-to-noise-
density ratio (C/N0) for inconsistency or unexpected (C/N0) from a DGPS monitoring site, could potentially be
convinced that a spoofed GPS signal was consistent.
The broadcast standard for the US Coast Guard DGPS navigation service [6] states that an unhealthy broadcast
should not be used under any circumstances. A healthy broadcast is one that is classified as healthy by its broadcast
messages, is presently monitored, and the the PRC timeout (where age of PRC exceeds 30 seconds) is not exceeded for
at least four satellites. It further states that the closest DGPS station should be chosen, where more than one broadcast
is available, provided it is healthy. The closest DGPS station should even be used if its signal strength is low relative
to other received signals.
A mitigating measure to increase survivability is to monitor the corrections from as many DGPS sites as possible,
discarding broadcasts that are inconsistent with the majority of broadcasts. This should be possible due to the high
level of coverage.
The denial of service techniques described in the following subsection may optimize the spoofing attacks described
above, limiting the surrounding DGPS stations that may be used for providing a cross-check.
3 DGPSIP is an open-source platform for providing DGPS corrections using RTCM over IP. Refer to http://www.wsrcc.
com/wolfgang/gps/dgps-ip.html.
3.2 DGPS Denial of Service
There are two methods we have identified for achieving denial of service:
1. Jamming the DGPS transmissions DGPS jamming involves causing denial of service though blocking Very High
Frequency(VHF) transmissions at opportune times. This is typically done by the deliberate radiation or reradiation
of electromagnetic energy, such that the transmitting power of a jamming device must exceed the power of the
signal. While jamming DGPS may require more power than GPS, it should be trivial as the DGPS transmissions do
not utilize modulation techniques that are resistant to jamming, such as fast frequency hopping or direct sequence
spreading.
2. Denial of service through spoofing health messages Based on the spoofing methods discussed in the previous
subsection, it would be possible to cause denial of service by providing misleading information in the following
RTCM messages:
– Type 5 - GPS Constellation Health This message could theoretically be used to convince the user equipment
that a given set of satellites are unusable. This could be done by setting the LOSS OF SATTELITE WARN-
ING parameter to 1, indicating to the user equipment that a change in the satellite’s state to “unhealthy” is
scheduled. In addition, the DATA HEALTH parameter could be set to 111, indicating that some or all of the
satellite almanac data is bad. The ability of the user equipment to perform cross checks, determines the extent
of denial of service that can be achieved.
– Type 7 - DGPS Radiobeacon Almanac This message is used to aid the user equipment in its choice of a
DGPS transmitter. The parameters, RADIOBEACON RANGE, RADIOBEACON HEALTH, and STATION
ID can be used to convey false information, such that the user equipment deems the neighboring beacons as
unhealthy, or unsatisfactory for corrections due to the range. This message can also be used to optimize a
spoofing attack, such that other DGPS transmitters that may be in range are disregarded.
Attacks that involve message manipulation, or broadcast of malicious messages are theoretically possible due to
the absence of origin authentication and the absence of cryptographic integrity protection.
4 TESLA Protocol – An Introduction
Time Efficient Stream Loss Tolerant Authentication (TESLA) is a multicast authentication protocol proposed by Perrig
et al.[5]. TESLA uses Message Authentication Codes (MAC) to achieve integrity of broadcast messages. The advan-
tage of using MACs is the reduction in computation and communications overhead compared to the use of asymmetric
cryptography. It is additionally scalable to large number of receivers. The protocol provides authentication and integrity
of the broadcast messages. The protocol assumes that the sender and the receiver have a weak time synchronisation.
Figure 2 briefly describes the broadcast in a TESLA protocol.
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Fig. 2. The TESLA Protocol
The protocol is described as follows:
Initialisation:
Time is synchronised between the sender and receivers and the disclosure delayed is agreed between the receiver
and sender. After this the key chain for generation of one time hash is committed subsequently.
Sender:
For each time slot ti there exists a key Ki, which expires as the time slot expires. Suppose a message M1 needs
to be broadcast to the receiver at time slot 5 and the agreed time delay is 2 timeslots, then the package P1 contain
the Message M1, MAC(M1, K5) and the key K3. Similarly a message M2 that needs to be broadcast at time slot 7 is
packaged as P2 containing, M2, MAC(M2, K7), andK5.
Receiver:
The receiver receives the package P1 and uses the message M1. The receiver, stores M1, MAC(M1, K5). Package
P2 containing M2 is received after a gap of two time slots. The receiver stores the message M2, MAC(M2, K7). The
receiver then uses the key K5 released in P2 to compute MAC‘(M1, K5). The receiver verifies that MAC‘(M1, K5) is
equal to MAC(M1, K5) received by the receiver in package P1 at time slot T5. If these two MAC are similar then the
integrity of the message M1 is assured.
Depending on the nature of the application where the broadcast is taking place, the TESLA protocol must be mod-
ified to suit the new environment. µTESLA is one such broadcast protocol for sensor networks requiring smaller com-
munication overheads compared to traditional TESLA. µTESLA and Secure Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP)
were proposed by Adrian et al. in [4] as part of secure protocols for sensor networks.
5 Proposed Message Authentication and Integrity Scheme for RTCM-SC104
There are a number of requirements for RTCM message transmissions that must be considered in developing an
authentication and integrity augmentation for DGPS:
1. It is a requirement of DGPS receivers that no pseudorange corrections may be applied to the the user’s navigations
solution if its age exceeds 30 seconds [6];
2. Bandwidth is very constrained, as DGPS broadcast stations typically transmit at 100 or 200bps;
3. Ancillary messages should be limited to 17 words. This constraint is due to the requirement that type 16 - GPS
Special Messages are not to exceed 5.1 seconds of transmission at 100bps (17 words) [6]. As such, messages used
for the authentication and integrity scheme must be limited to at most this size;
4. The shorter the message, the greater the frequency of RTCM headers, significantly improving impulse noise
performance. In addition, shorter correction messages provide lower latency and operate better at low data rates
or in noisy environments; and
5. The computational power available to DGPS receivers may be limited in some circumstances. In larger vessels
this would not be a consideration.
Traditional asymmetric signature mechanisms can be used to provide both authentication and cryptographic in-
tegrity protection. These mechanisms however, are too costly in both bandwidth, for the transmission of signatures
and associated public key certificates, and in computation, for them to be used in DGPS. As such, light-weight broad-
cast authentication protocols were investigated.
As modification of RTCM messages would result in incompatibility with existing receivers, it was necessary
to create additional messages used for supporting the authentication and integrity scheme, such that if the DGPS
receiver does not support the scheme, the integrity and authentication messages are ignored. Providing an additional
integrity message for each RTCM message transmitted would result in an inefficient use of the very limited bandwidth,
and reduce the ability of DGPS stations to provide corrections without significant delay. As such, we proposed a
modification to the TESLA protocol, which is detailed in the following subsections.
5.1 Initial Setup
A given DGPS monitor station is represented as A, and a DGPS receiver is represented as B. y = F(x) is a secure
one-way function, such that it is infeasible to calculate x from y.
The following initialization procedure is used to setup a hash chain, such that there is a hash value Kn for every
12 seconds of each hour for a total of 300 12 second intervals, and an additional value K0 that can be distributed to
clients.
1. A computes K300 = F(s), where s is a random secret number chosen by A.
2. A computes K0 by hashing K300 300 times, such that K299 = F(K300), K298 = F(K299), ...K0 = F(K1). The
values K299...K0 are kept secret.
3. A → B : SigA(K0), CertA
It is assumed that the DGPS broadcast station’s public key has been certified by a root DGPS authority, and the
public key of the root authority has been installed on the DGPS receiver via an offline process. Hence the certificate
corresponding to the private key of a DGPS broadcast station can be verified by a given DGPS receiver, and therefore
can validate the signature used to authenticate K0. The signature of K0 for each new hash chain at the beginning of
each hour is to be distributed 5 minutes before the commencement of the new chain in the proposed Type-59 message
(Figure 8).
As SigA(K0) and CertA are comparatively large and data bandwidth is limited, these message entities are frag-
mented over 12 message sequences to reduce the overhead on communications. A DGPS receiver must obtain the 12
messages in order to reassemble the public key certificate of the DGPS site, such that it can verify the integrity of
DGPS transmissions. This process takes approximately 5 minutes at 200bps. The certificate format is detailed in Ta-
ble 3 and is based on an X509 certificate, retaining only the necessary fields in order to minimize its size. The Subject
field is the 10 bit broadcast station ID defined in RTCM. The size of the public key and signature are based on the use
of 170 bit Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which provides equivalent security of 1024 bit RSA.
Issuer ID: 56 bits
Subject: 10 bits (BS-ID)
Valid from: 24 bits
Valid to: 24 bits
Public key: (A) 170 bits (ECC)
Signature: (K0) 336 bits (ECC)
Table 3. Public Key Certificate CertA
5.2 The Broadcast Protocol
The protocol is synchronized in two ways:
– Time synchronization. The Z-COUNT4 field in the header of RTCM messages facilitates the time synchronization
of the DGPS monitoring station and the DGPS receiver. The Z-COUNT field counts from 0 to 6000, incrementing
every 0.6 seconds. We define protocol timeslots, such that each time slot has a duration of 12 seconds (a Z-COUNT
increment of 20). The secret hash values K299 to K0 are sequentially released in each timeslot.
– Message sequence synchronization. The sequence (SEQ) field in the header of RTCM messages facilitates the
message synchronization. We define message sequences, such that each sequence counts from 0 to 7, incrementing
on each message. The first 7 messages in a given sequence are used for existing RTCM messages. The eighth
message is an integrity message and is defined in § 6. An integrity message M7, contains an iterated Message
Authentication Code (MAC) calculated from the first 7 messages in the sequence and keyed by Kn, the hash value,
Kn+2, 28 bits of SigA(K0) of the current hash chain, and 52 bits of CertA.
Figure 3 illustrates the protocol synchronization, and how message sequences are asynchronously transmitted.
It can be observed from the diagram that the M7 corresponds to a single timeslot, and as such that MAC of the
message hashes in the sequence are keyed using a key generated from the hash corresponding to this timeslot. If M7 is
transmitted over two time slots, the timeslot at which the beginning of the message commenced is used for the keying
of the MAC.
Figure 4 illustrates the generation of the integrity messages from the other messages in a given sequence, and the
keys derived from the hash values in the hash chain.
4 The modified Z-COUNT is a counter used for synchronization that increments every 0.6 seconds from 0 to 6000
Fig. 3. Example of timeslots and asynchronous message sequences
Fig. 4. Broadcast Authentication Protocol with Integrity
In order to be backwards compatible with existing DGPS receivers and the RTCM protocol, integrity cannot be
added to existing messages. Due to the limited communications bandwidth, it is not practical to transmit an integrity
message for each RTCM message. Not only would this severely reduce effective communications bandwidth, it would
significantly delay high rate partial GPS corrections (RTCM Message Type-9). To overcome this limitation, an iterated
MAC is used, such that integrity is provided to a given message sequence rather than each individual message.
Figure 55 illustrates an iterated MAC (keyed hash function). The MAC is included in M7 is generated based on
the hashes of messages m0 to m6 in a given message sequence. This effectively means that an integrity failure on a
message within a given sequence would result in integrity failure for all messages in the sequence.
5.3 Verification
This section details the verification process as performed on the user’s DGPS receiver. We define the following notation
such that:
5 Diagram sourced from Handbook of Applied Cryptography p332.
Fig. 5. General Model for Iterative Hash Function
– HASH represents a hash value;
– F(x) is a secure hash function, such that it is infeasible to calculate x from F(x);
– F′(x) is a secure key generation function;
– T-SLOT represents the timeslot used for hash distribution. It is calculated as a function of the RTCM header
Z-COUNT field, such that the T-SLOT = INT
( Z−COUNT
20
)
; and
– MAC denotes a message authentication code calculated using an iterated keyed hash MAC algorithm.
The DGPS receiver maintains two sequences, a message sequence mseq, a buffer sequence bseq, and a set of
hashvalues hashvalues:
– mseq denotes a sequence of message hashes. mseq : seq HASH;
– bseq denotes a sequence of triplets containing a timeslot, the message sequence and a MAC. bseq : seq(T-SLOT, mseq, MAC);
and
– hashvalues denotes the function hashvalues : HASH 7→ T-SLOT, such that a hashvalue maps to a given timeslot.
The example below details the verification procedure for a DGPS receiver, starting to verify messages from timeslot
i + 2, where i is the first timeslot for a the current hash chain, and the current timeslot is i + 2 (Refer to Figure 3).
In timeslot i + 2, messages M2, ..M7, M′0, M′1 are received by the DGPS receiver. First the hash of M2 is concate-
nated to the sequence mseq. A triplet containing the timeslot of the last message in the sequence, M7, mseq, and the
MAC of the message sequence obtained from M7, is concatenated to bufseq. On conclusion of a message sequence,
and buffering of the message hashes, mseq is reset to an empty sequence.
If M7 is received, the released hash value is verified in order to authenticate the source of the hash. The authenti-
cation is performed by hashing the released hash value until K0 is verified.
Although bufseq represents a complete message sequence, it cannot be verified until hashvalue K(i+5) or later is
released. For example, if there is no M7 in a timeslot when K(i+5) is released, and the next M7 contains K(i+6), the
receiver can simply hash K(i+6) to produce K(i+5).
As with M2, the other messages received in the timeslot are hashed and concatenated to the message buffer, mseq.
From the previous timeslot (i + 1), mseq = 〈F(M0), F(M1)〉
Timeslot (i + 2):
Received messages M2, M3, M4, M5, M6, M7, M′0, M′1
mseq′ = mseq
 
〈F(M2), F(M3), F(M4), F(M5), F(M6)〉
bufseq′ = bufseq   (T-SLOTM7 , mseq, MACM0..M6)
mseq′ = 〈〉
B verifies K(i+2) by verifying
K(i+1) = F(K(i+2)), ...K0 = F(K1)
hashvalues′ = hashvalues ∪ {K(i+2) 7→ T-SLOTM7}
mseq′ = mseq
 
〈F(M′0), F(M′1)〉
As K(i+5) is not yet released, the first mseq in the bufseq cannot be verified yet. Timeslot i + 3 proceeds similarly to
that of i + 2.
Timeslot (i + 3):
Received messages M′2, M′3, M′4, M′5, M′6, M′7, M′′0 , M′′1 , M′′2 , M′′3 , M′′4
mseq′ = mseq
 
〈F(M′2), F(M′3), F(M′4), F(M′5), F(M′6)〉
bufseq′ = bufseq   (T-SLOTM′
7
, mseq, MACM′
0
..M′
6
)
mseq′ = 〈〉
B verifies K(i+3) by verifying
K(i+3) = F(K(i+2))
hashvalues′ = hashvalues ∪ {K(i+3) 7→ T-SLOTM′
7
}
.
.
.
In timeslot (i+5), K(i+5) is released in M′′′7 . After performing the buffering process as in timeslot i+2, the verification
of message sequences for which the newly released hash value is required, are verified. The MAC of the message
sequence, maci, is calculated and compared to the MAC stored in the buffered message sequence, MACM′
0
..M′
6
. The
MAC is computed using the message hashes and a key generated from secure key generation function, F ′, which
computes a key using the hash value returned for the time slot, T-SLOTM′
7
in the hashvalues set.
Timeslot (i + 5):
Received messages M′′′4 , M′′′5 , M′′′6 , M′′′7
(Buffering process of message hashes and corresponding timeslots proceeds
as in timeslot (i + 2))
mseqi = head bufseq
= (T-SLOTM′
7
, 〈F(M′0), F(M′1), F(M′2), F(M′3), F(M′4), F(M′5), F(M′6)〉,
MACM0..M6)
maci = MAC(F(M′0)..F(M′6))F′(hashvalues(T-SLOTM′
7
))
if maci = MACM′
0
..M′
6
, messages M′0..M′6 have not been tampered with and
originated from a certified DGPS broadcast source.
5.4 Discussion of Protocol Security
In this section we discuss the security of the modified TESLA protocol. Archer in [1] presents a mechanized cor-
rectness proof of the basic TESLA protocol [5] using TAME6. Archer in the paper also concludes that the degree of
6 TAME (Timed Automata Modeling Environment) is a an interface to PVS, a verification system that supports a specification
language integrated with support tools and a theorem prover.
similarity of the proof of an analogous protocol to the proof of basic TESLA will depend on the degree of difference
of this protocol from basic TESLA.
We assume that changes to the basic TESLA protocol do not modify the security properties of the proposed
protocol. The proposed protocol does not vary significantly from the basic TESLA protocol except in its use of an
iterated MAC for generation of a single integrity message, rather than a standard MAC being generated for each
message transmitted.
A receiver can verify an integrity message in a given message sequence using the proposed protocol if:
– M7 is successfully received;
– The succeeding sequences containing the hash used to generate the keys have been received;
– Applying the iterated MAC function to hashes of the received messages of a given sequence, using keys generated
from the revealed hashes, yields a value equal to the MAC included in the integrity message, M7, as detailed in
§ 5.2;
– Mi of a given message sequence arrives before Mi+1 of the same sequence;
– The receiver has verified the DGPS monitoring site’s public key certificate using the pre-installed public key
certificate of the “DGPS certification authority”; and
– The receiver has verified that K0 originated from a given DGPS monitoring site based on verification of the
certificate containing the public key corresponding to the signature.
6 Proposed Implementation
In this section, implementation details of the proposed authentication and integrity scheme are discussed.
The verification process could feasibly be operated in one of two modes:
1. Sequential integrity validation. Where the authentication and integrity scheme must validate the origin and in-
tegrity of a given message before allowing it to be used in calculating the position solution.
2. Orthogonal integrity validation. Where the integrity process operates orthogonally to the standard DGPS process-
ing, such that when the origin or integrity of a message cannot be verified, the user is alarmed to the integrity
problem.
Because the verification process takes at most 50 seconds at 200bps (Refer to § 6.1), it is not feasible to perform the
verification sequentially, providing only integrity verified messages to the GPS receiver. This is because pseudorange
corrections must not be older than 30 seconds [6].
As such, the verification logic operates orthogonally to the standard DGPS processing, such that integrity failures
are conveyed to the user at most 50 seconds after they have been received. Instant integrity verification would induce
an unsustainable overhead on communications, delaying the pseudorange corrections, such that their age would easily
exceed the 30 second limit.
Similar to the application of integrity messages as defined in [6], an integrity failure detected using the proposed
scheme will be conveyed to the user equipment as a textual message, as in health and monitor problems. In addition,
message integrity failure should cause a visual alarm to activate.
An example “Trusted DGPS receiver” is illustrated in Figure 6, where the GPS receiver and DGPS receiver are
separate. In the case that the DGPS receiver contains a GPS receiver, the Message Scheduler component is not needed.
The trusted DGPS receiver consists of the following components:
1. Message Scheduler. This component is responsible for providing an RTCM message stream to both the Integrity
Verification Processor, and the GPS receiver. The Message Scheduler removes the Integrity messages from the
output RTCM data stream to the GPS receiver, and replaces them with 8 Type 6 GPS Null Frame messages. If an
integrity failure is detected by the Integrity Verification Processor, the user is alarmed though a Type 16 - GPS
Special Message. This message is queued in the Message Scheduler to be sent during the period where the Type 6
GPS Null Frame messages are being sent.
2. Integrity Verification Processor. The Integrity Verification Processor performs the protocol functions, as detailed
in § 5. A smart card or similar memory is used to store the DGPS Authority certificate. This certificate is used to
verify the public key certificates broadcast from the DGPS transmitters, and hence authenticate the source of the
broadcast hash, K0, for each hour.
Fig. 6. Example of Trusted DGPS Receiver
Two new RTCM messages are proposed, the Type-58 Integrity Message (Figure 7), and the Type-59 K0 Signature
Message (Figure 8). The message size is based on the use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which have consid-
erably smaller key sizes than equivalent asymmetric algorithms such as RSA and DSA. ECC public keys are 170 bits
and signatures are 336 bits. The security of ECC for this key size is comparable to 1024 bit RSA or DSA.
Fig. 7. Proposed RTCM Type-58 Integrity Message
6.1 Efficiency of the Scheme
This subsection discusses the efficiency of the scheme in terms of bandwidth utilization and verification time. There
is a tradeoff between time to authentication / integrity alarm and bandwidth utilization. Message sequences can be
reconfigured with larger numbers of messages, resulting in reduced consumption of bandwidth, however the time to
alarm will correspondingly increase.
Bandwidth Utilization The following measures of bandwidth utilization have been determined using message se-
quences containing the smallest and largest pseudorange correction messages. The largest pseudorange correction
Fig. 8. Proposed RTCM Type-59 K0 Signature Message
message is the type 1 message containing corrections for the whole set of satellites in view of the monitor station (up
to 12). The smallest pseudorange correction message is the type 9 message, containing the same format as the type 1
message, except in smaller groups of three satellites per message. Other message types are infrequent, and as such are
not considered in this analysis. The minimum and maximum message sizes are described below.
– Maximum PRC message size = 660 bits. A type 1 message with 12 visible satellites occupies 22 30-bit words,
2 words being the message header, the remaining 20 words consisting of 24 bits of correction data and 6 bits of
parity per word. The correction data for each satellite occupies 40 bits.
– Minimum PRC message size = 210 bits. A type 9 message contains a partial correction set for at most 3 satellites.
This message contains 7 30-bits words, 2 words being the message header and 5 words consisting of satellite
correction data as defined in the type 1 message.
Table 4 details the bandwidth utilization of the integrity scheme for message sequences containing minimum and
maximum size PRC messages. In a message sequence of 8 messages, there are 7 standard RTCM messages and an
integrity message (proposed type 58 integrity message), which introduces an overhead of 480 bits for each message
sequence. For a message sequence of maximum size PRC messages, the integrity scheme requires 480 bits per 4620
bits. For a message sequence of minimum size PRC messages, the integrity scheme requires 480 bits per 1470 bits.
Bandwidth Utilization (%)
Protocol Min Max
Proposed Scheme 10.39 32.65
TESLA 72.73 228.57
Table 4. Comparison of Bandwidth Utilization
The proposed protocol scheme is also contrasted with the standard TESLA protocol in Table 4. In the TESLA
protocol, each message contains a MAC and the key used to calculate the MAC of a message in a previous timeslot.
As such, 440 bits must be added to the size of each message, resulting in an overhead of 480 bits per 660 bit message
for a maximum size PRC message, and 480 bits per 210 bit message for minimum size PRC message.
Verification Time This section discusses the performance of the scheme in terms of time to alarm of authentication
or integrity failure.
The minimum and maximum size PRC messages, as discussed in § 6.1, are given below with their corresponding
transmission times for 100 and 200 bits per second (bps).
– Message sequence of minimum size PRC messages.
1950 bits (1470 + 480) = 19.5s at 100bps, or 9.75s at 200bps; and
– Message sequence of maximum size PRC messages.
5100 bits (4620 + 480) = 51s at 100bps, or 25.5s at 200bps.
The hash value used to key the MAC in an integrity message, is released in another integrity message 2 timeslots after
the initial integrity message is transmitted. At minimum the hash value could be released in:
tx time(480 bits)+1 timeslot+tx time(480 bits), where the initial integrity message is transmitted at tx time(480
bits) seconds before the end of timeslot i, and the hash value is released in an integrity message transmitted at the
beginning of timeslot i + 2.
– Minimum hash value release time at 100bps.
4.8s + 12s + 4.8s = 21.6s
– Minimum hash value release time at 200bps.
2.4s + 12s + 2.4s = 16.8s
Given the minimum hash value release times above, the time to receive the released hash value in message se-
quences consisting of minimum and maximum size PRC messages can be calculated. With sequences of minimum
size PRC messages, the key could be obtained from an integrity message 2 message sequences after (39s) at 100bps,
or 2 message sequences after at 200bps (19.5s). With message sequences consisting of maximum size PRC messages,
the key would be released 1 message sequence at 100bps (51s) or 1 message sequence at 200bps (25.1s).
We define the time to alarm of integrity failure as the time it takes for the DGPS user to be alarmed to an integrity
failure from the point which an integrity failure in a message occurs. This can be calculated as follows:
hash value release time + r + c, Where r is the remaining messages of a sequence which is at most is 7 messages.
At maximum, this is 4440 bits (660*6 + 480) (44.4s at 100bps and 22.2s at 200bps) and at minimum 1740 bits (210*6
+ 480) (17.4s at 100bps and 8.7s at 200bps).
Where c is the computation time required integrity verification. The computation is negligible compared to the time
delay imposed by the limited bandwidth, as hash functions are typically not computationally intensive. A computa-
tionally intensive public key operation would only be performed every hour for the verification of the newly distributed
K0.
Table 5 contrasts the time to alarm of integrity failure based on these numbers, the remaining messages of a
sequence, and the computation time.
Max Time to Alarm of Integrity Failure (seconds)
Data Rate Seq of Min Size PRC Msgs Seq of Max Size PRC Msgs
100bps 39 + 17.4 + c ≈ 56.4 51 + 44.4 + c ≈ 95.4
200bps 19.5 + 8.7 + c ≈ 28.2 25.1 + 22.2 + c ≈ 47.3
Table 5. Time to Alarm of Integrity Failure
While time to alarm of integrity failure may be large in some cases with a bandwidth of 100bps, it should be noted
that authentication failure will be alarmed at maximum 44.4s at 100bps and 22.2s at 200bps and at minimum 17.4s at
100bps and 8.7s at 200bps, based on the maximum number of messages remaining in a message sequence before an
integrity message.
Depending on the the environment, the protocol can be configured for faster alarm times. For example, the current
configuration may be adequate for large waterways, however for constricted waterways, it may be desirable to have
significantly faster alarm times. Future research is required to determine optimal configuration parameters from a
prototype implementation of the protocol.
7 Conclusion
Securing DGPS is critical to protection of communications in marine navigation. The disruption and tampering of
which can potentially result in large environmental and economic losses. The paper has facilitated a means to assure
integrity and authentication of DGPS messages through the proposed protocol. This protocol provides efficiencies in
both utilization of bandwidth and in computation. The proposed additions to the RTCM protocol ensure backwards-
compatibility with existing DGPS receivers, with a relatively low cost on the latency of pseudorange corrections.
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